These notes were made with the aid of a new and very useful edition and translation of the Oxyrhynchus Historian: P.R. McKechnie & S.J. Kern, ed. & tr., Hellenica Oxyrhynchia London 1988.

The Cairo Fragments

Narrates the Athenian expedition to Ephesos under Thrasyllos in 409 BC. The story is told at length by Xenophon (Hist. 1.2) and briefly by Diodoros (13. 54, 65); Xenophon dates it in 408/7. The Athenians have disembarked from the triremes and are attacking the city of Ephesos; but the attack is repelled and the papyrus breaks off with the Athenians retreating to the ships.

The Florence Fragments

(1.1) An Athenian incursion into Megara, where Spartan troops fight in support of the locals and 20 Spartans die (consistent with Diod. 13. 65). (1.2) A mixed reaction at Athens to the victory seems a conscious foreshadowing of the Arginusai aftermath. (2) Very fragmentary, this section may be a digression on the Spartan navarch Pedaritos. Note the citation of Thucydides by name (2.32). The author is saying that Thucydides also wrote about some subject, but what that subject is cannot be determined. (3) Very fragmentary. Preliminaries to the battle of Notion, 407 BC. (4.1-4) Naval encounter at Notion (Xen. Hist. 1.5.11-14; Diod. 13.71). Antiochus uses 10 fast triremes, possibly to draw Lysander out of the harbor; but when Lysander launches all his ships one Athenian contingent flees, clearly not having intended to give battle. Other Athenians at the harbour of Kolophon try to man their ships and get in the battle - but 22 Athenian ships are lost and others blockaded at Notion. The account is especially interesting for source criticism: Diodoros reflects the Oxy Hist, possibly through Ephoros, while Plutarch (Lys. 3-4) has followed Xenophon, whose account is independent of the Oxy Hist. (5) An espionage tactic. An Athenian outside the walls of a city under seige passes messages back and forth with a guard on the rampart by means of a rope. The context is disputed. Note that the Athenian spy seems to hide in a sanctuary of Demeter while a surrogate (a Myndian) handles the collection of the notes.

The London Fragments

(6.1) Spring, 396 BC. Demainetos sails out with a trireme; he has the backing of the Boule and some of the citizens, but not the authorization of the Ekklesia. It is quite clear that the ship is a state hull; he gets it "from the neosoikoi". (6.2) The aristocrats, led by Thrasyboulos, Aisimos, and Anytos raise a fuss; the Boule calls an assembly and the bouleutai deny complicity. (6.3) The Ekklesia votes to send to Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aegina, disowning Demainetos and revealing prior acts of hostility against Sparta carried out by him and his friends.

(7.1) These acts included manning and supplying arms to Konon's fleet (now fighting the Spartans on behalf of the Great King), as well as a clandestine embassy to the Great King. The embassy was intercepted by the Spartans and the envoys executed. (7.2) A discussion of the motivations of the anti-Spartan 'parties' in Athens (led by Epikrates and Kephalos), Argos, and Boiotia. Some say bribes from Timokrates (the envoy from Pharnabazos) were responsible for the anti-Spartan feeling and were the cause of the Korinthian War; but the Oxy Hist argues than pro-war sentiment ran deeper than that, and sees Timokrates' money as merely a push in that direction. In the case of the Argives and Boiotians, the cause for discontent was personal and political: the Spartans favored their political opponents. In the case of the Athenians, those responsible were demagogues and hawks who wanted to enrich themselves at public expense. (7.3-5) Most Korinthians were anti-Spartan for (vague) political reasons, but Timolaos had a private grudge. The reason for the grudge is not given, but Timolaos' former zeal on behalf of Sparta is illustrated by a catalogue of his successes against Athens: (a) among some unnamed islands; (b) in a naval battle at Amphipolis; and (c) in inciting a revolt at Thasos, late 411 BC (cf. Thuc. 8.64).

(8.1-2) Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aegina, catches Demainetos at Thorikos. But Demainetos tranfers his men to another ship, abandons his at Thorikos, and sails to meet Konon at Rhodes.

(9.1) Chronological note: the passage shows that the Oxy Hist is using a Thucydidean scheme of summers and winters. The 'eighth year' is beginning; this will be either 396/5 or 395/4, but it is not clear what year the Oxy Hist is using as a benchmark or why. (9.2-3) Pollis succeeds Archelaidas as Spartan navarch in Asia Minor. A Phoenician fleet at Kaunos in Lykia near the border with Karia; Konon at Kaunos. But the precise historical context is unclear.

(11.3) 395 BC. A confrontation on land at Sardis between Agesilaos and Tissaphernes, the latter in command of a large number of Persian troops. The same battle[1] is at Xen. Hell. 3.4.20-25; Ages. 1.28-33; Diod. 14.80. (11.4) Numbers of the Spartan forces. Agesilaos attacks, using cavalry for encirclement. (11.5) The Spartan commander Xenokles turns the tide of the battle with a successful ambush. The Persians, most on horseback, flee; 600 die. The Spartans plunder their camp.

(12.1) Tissaphernes and the Persians withdraw to Sardis. Agesilaos advances into Phrygia, ravaging the land as he goes. (12.3) Agesilaos crosses Lydia into Phrygia, reaching the Maeander. Note the attempt at topographical description. (12.4) Agesilaos decides not to cross the Maeander; more comments on the locale. (13) The section is highly fragmentary. It deals with the replacement of Tissaphernes by Tithraustes and the execution of Tissaphernes (told at Xen. Hell. 3.4.25; Diod. 14.80.6-8). (14) The section is highly fragmentary. It is a character sketch, complimentary, of some individual, probably Cyrus but possibly Agesilaos.

(15.1) 395 BC. Konon prepares a democratic coup d'etat at Rhodes (Rhodes expelled the Spartans in 396). He gets the Rhodians used to seeing his men drawn up in arms in the city. Konon sails to Kaunos with 20 ships, leaving his lieutenants ( paredroi ) to manage the coup. Note that they were also Athenian citizens. (15.2) The Rhodian conspirators assassinate some members of the oligarchic government and call an improptu assembly. (15.3) Konon returns; the revolution succeeds. Notes: this event is not told elsewhere. Konon's desire for a democratic gov't even though the oligarchic one was friendly to him seems to reflect that he is carrying out Athenian objectives.

(16.1) 395 BC. War between Phokis and Boiotia, fomented by Thebans (cf Diod. 14.81.1-3). (16.2) Review of the Boiotian municipal political system: a limited franchise for seats on four councils in each city. (16.3) Review of the Boiotian federal political system (the so-called 'Boiotian Constitution')[2]: eleven divisions ( merê ), each providing one Boiotarch; Thebes and its subject areas provided four of the eleven, with the remaining seven coming from the twelve other major towns. The system obviously favors Thebes. (11.4) 60 bouleutai per boiotarch; military service was also organized according to these eleven divisions, as were taxes, jury duty, and public works. Synedria and koina (= popular assemblies?) met on the Kadmea at Thebes.

(17.1) Stasis at Thebes. Leontiades and his followers were pro-Spartan; Ismenias and his followers ostensibly pro-Athenian, because of their role in the events of 404/3; but the Oxy Hist denies that Ismenias' faction was pro-Athenian and represents them as primarily out for themselves, though also definitely anti-Spartan. (17.2) These two factions polarize Theban politics; Ismenias' group has the upper hand. (17.3) But during the Dekeleian War Leontiades' faction had been dominant, because of the proximity of the Spartans at Dekeleia. The Oxy Hist also notes that the war had increased Theban power over Boiotia because many people moved to Thebes to be safe from Athenian incursion. (17.4) Thebes and Boiotia also profited greatly from plundering the abandoned countryside of Attika. (17.5) General lavishness of the Athenian country houses made them excellent for plundering.

(18.1) The role of Ismenias and his cohorts in fomenting the Korinthian War; the gold promised by Pharnabazos through Timokrates was a factor. (18.2) Ismenias kindles the war by getting the Phokians to attack the Western Lokrians. (18.3) An old dispute over some land on the border between Phokis and Western Lokris was used as a pretext for the Phokian invasion. (18.4) As per Ismenias' plan, the Lokrians call in the Boiotians for help vs. the Phokians. The Phokians hear of this and appeal to Sparta; Sparta sends envoys to Thebes telling Boiotia to desist, but this plea is ignored. The Boiotians invade Phokis. (18.5) Military successes and failures of the Boiotians in Phokis: they are unable to take the cities of Daulis or Hyampolis.

(19.1) Cheiricrates is now the Spartan naval commander; meanwhile, Konon sails 20 triremes to Kaunos to get support ($) from Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. (19.2) Konon's fleet is badly underpayed and in danger of dissolution. Excursus on paying for fleets; Kyros' role (for the Spartan fleet) is noted, and also that the Great King tended to be an unreliable paymaster. (19.3) Tithraustes coughs up 220 T of Tissaphernes' money, then goes to consult the great King, leaving his generals in charge of ample funds for furtherance of the war effort.

(20.1) Internal dissension is brewing among the men of Konon's fleet. The Cypriots there believe (mistakenly) that Konon intends to short-change them on the pay; they choose a Carpasian as their spokeman. (20.2-3) Konon meets this man and reassures him. But as they go to tell the men the good news, some Messenians seize the Carpasian as a traitor (supposedly without Konon's consent). The Cypriots rescue the Carpasian, but because they no longer trust Konon they set sail for Cyprus in some of the triremes. (20.4) The rebels hole up at a camp near Kaunos. (20.5) Konon borrows the Greek garrison at Kaunos and smashes the rebellion. (20.6) But the rebellion flares again at Rhodes. Konon rushes to Rhodes and puts it down, then hurries to finish paying the crews; the army is saved.

(21.1) Agesilaos' campaigns in Asia Minor. He crosses Lydia peacefully (truce with Tithraustes) but ravages Phrygia, the territory of Pharnabazos, and carries out forced levies in neighbouring Mysia. (21.2) Agesilaos tries to negotiate the narrow pass by the Mysian Olympos under a truce, but the treacherous Mysians ambush his men as they cross. Agesilaos responds the next day by luring the Mysian forces into an ambush of his own. (21.3) Agesilaos makes truce with the Mysians, and proceeds to further ravaging in Phrygia, with Spithradates as guide. (21.4) Excursus on Spithradates: a former aide to Pharnabazos, he had come over to Agesilaos after falling out with his old boss. Agesilaos accepted him for his tactical knowledge, but also because he loved his young son Megabates. (21.5) Unsuccessful attack by Agesilaos on the Lions' Heads (Leonton Kephaloi). (21.6) Agesilaos makes a half-hearted try at the city of Gordion, then proceeds into Paphlagonia.

(22.1-2) Spithradates mediates a truce/alliance with the Paphlagonians and their king Gyes for Agesilaos. Worried about short supplies, he heads for the sea. Remarks on the route. Gyes also contributes some troops, 1000 horse and 2000 foot. (22.3) Agesilaos marches back into Mysia and inflicts futher punishment for the Olympos incident; then to Daskylion via Miletou Teichos. Pharnabazos' palace was at Daskylion. (22.4) Agesilaos sends his booty to Cyzicus via Pankalos (one of Cheiricrates' epibatai) who now commands five triremes. He himself prepares to winter at Cappadokia .... the papyrus breaks off here